Are the Seeds of Bad Governance Sown in Good Times? by Antoinette Schoar & Ebonya L. Washington
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









We thank Yale’s Institution for Social and Policy Studies for financial support. We thank Martin Baker,
Martijn Cremers, Gary Gorton, Tim Guinnane, Naomi Laromeaux, Nagpurnanand Prabhala, Roberta
Romano, Andrei Shleifer, and participants at the MIT Sloan faculty lunch, MIT organizational economics
seminar, the CAF conference at the Indian School of Business, the finance seminar at UNC, University
of Washington and the Yale Law School’s Law and Economics seminar for helpful comments. All
mistakes are of course our own. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2011 by Antoinette Schoar and Ebonya L. Washington. All rights reserved. Short sections of text,
not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit,
including © notice, is given to the source.Are the Seeds of Bad Governance Sown in Good Times?
Antoinette Schoar and Ebonya L. Washington
NBER Working Paper No. 17061
May 2011, Revised October 2012
JEL No. G34
ABSTRACT
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1.  Introduction 
 
 
One of the classic debates in corporate finance revolves around the question of 
whether firms’ governance structures arise optimally in response to competitive pressures 
in the market for corporate control. The argument put forward by supporters of this view 
is that competition for resources, especially capital, will force firms to improve their 
governance structures in order to obtain better cost of capital. In their seminal paper, 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that firms in which governance matters more for the cost 
of capital will develop better governance structures in order to attract investors. Firms 
whose valuations are not sensitive to governance structure will thus have poorer 
governance.  As a result, one should not expect a strong empirical relationship between 
firm governance and performance in the cross section. On the other side of the debate are 
proponents of the view that the market for corporate control does not function perfectly; 
instead, entrenched managers shape the firm’s governance structure for their private 
benefit. Examples of this view are Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988); Lang and Stulz 
(1994) and Yermack (1996). A related argument suggests that such opportunistic 
behavior by managers is facilitated when  shareholders are either too shortsighted or do 
not pay enough attention to effectively impose governance pressures; see for example 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), and Yermack (1997).  This second view of 
governance would therefore suggest a positive relationship between better (for 
shareholders) governance structures and firm performance.  
 
A large empirical literature has examined the impact of governance on firm 
performance. Many early papers struggled exactly with the omitted variable bias pointed 
out by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) which implies that any correlation between governance 
and performance in the cross section cannot be interpreted in a causal way. A number of 
more recent papers have looked at exogenous variation to governance and found a strong 
positive impact of improved governance on firm performance; see for example Bertrand 
and Mullainathan (2002), Garvey and Hanka (1999), and Bhagat and Bolton (2008).  
 
In the current paper we turn the question on its head: we investigate when and 
how changes in governance provisions and CEO compensation come about.   
Documenting how governance structures emerge is important for understanding whether 
managers are able to entrench themselves over time. Specifically, we ask whether 
governance changes are predicted by either abnormally good or bad firm performance. If 
the main force shaping the governance provisions of firms is market pressure, we would 
expect to see a tightening of governance in favor of shareholder rights after periods of 
poor firm performance. However, we would not expect a worsening (or loosening) of 3 
 
governance after good performance, since positive stock returns would provide 
confirmation of the quality of the firm’s governance structure. On the other hand, if 
managers’ preferences for entrenchment and weak oversight are a first order factor in 
shaping the governance structure of firms, we would expect to see deterioration in 
governance structures after periods of particularly good firm performance. The idea that 
shareholder attention is limited and that shareholders pay closer attention to firms that are 
performing poorly than those that are performing well  has been previously proposed in 
studies  by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), Baker et al (2007), and Jenter and Kanaan 
(2008). 
 
Shareholders vote on changes to the governance provisions of a firm including the 
CEO’s compensation in both routine annual and less-frequent special shareholder 
meetings. While the timing of annual meetings is set well in advance, the occurrence and 
timing of special meetings are at the discretion of management.
1 Thus, using a panel of 
shareholder meetings for 1500 S&P firms which were obtained from the Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS), we first examine the endogeneity of the timing of special 
meetings with respect to firm performance. We define abnormally good (bad) 
performance as the extent to which the firm beats (falls short of) their predicted analysts’ 
earnings forecasts. Earnings surprises are defined as the absolute difference between the 
analysts’ consensus forecast for the quarter and the realized quarterly earnings divided by 
the forecast. We find that the mean positive surprise increases the probability of a special 
meeting in the quarter by over five percent. In contrast, we find little or no impact of 
negative earnings surprises. These results also hold if we use quarterly stock returns in 
place of earnings surprises. Interestingly, when we decompose the returns into the 
industry overall return and the idiosyncratic stock returns, the timing of special meetings 
is correlated with both components but it seems more consistently affected by the firm 
specific return. When repeating the analysis for earnings surprises before annual 
meetings, we do not find any significant relationship. This is comforting since the timing 
of annual meetings is exogenous and set more than a year in advance. We further present 
evidence that the surprises are not endogenously caused by earnings manipulation 
suggesting that managers are responding to, but not causing, these earnings surprises. 
 
Secondly, we examine the relationship between abnormal earnings surprises and 
the types of proposals included on the meeting agenda. We classify ballot propositions as 
bad (good) governance items if the IRRC shareholder voting guidance officially 
encourages shareholders to vote against (in favor of) these items. Examples of bad 
governance proposals are the introduction of a dual class stock or poison pills, while 
good proposals would eliminate these measures.  We find that positive earnings surprises 
increase the frequency with which management places bad governance items on the 
ballot of these special meetings.  These ballot items result in real changes to the quality of 
corporate governance as measured by the GIM Index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003). We again find a strongly asymmetric effect: after periods of poor stock 
performance, there is no increase in the number of pro-shareholder provisions that firms 
                                                 
1 Shareholders also have the option of calling for special meetings; however, de facto, this very rarely 
happens (and does not happen in our data) since the transaction costs for shareholders are enormously high 
in setting up a special meeting. 4 
 
put on the agenda of a special meeting. We interpret these findings as demonstrating that 
managers strategically call shareholder meetings to put up ballot items in their own favor 
after periods in which the firm has done well.  
 
Finally, we analyze how these findings vary with the existing governance 
structure of the firm, using two different measures of the quality of governance structure.  
We find that poorly, but not well, governed firms are more likely to set up special 
meetings, particularly special meetings with bad governance proposals following good 
performance.  This result is robust to using alternative measures of governance quality 
such as the presence of large activist shareholders.   
 
One concern regarding our results may be that our findings, while statistically 
significant, lack economic relevance due to the relative infrequency of special meetings 
and the failure to pass managerial proposals. So to be clear, the importance of our results 
stems not from our ability to predict meeting time or agenda per se, but in uncovering a 
channel by which changes in the quality of governance occur. Overall, these results 
demonstrate that governance structures are changed endogenously in favor of 
management when the firm has done well. We see two main hypotheses that could 
explain these findings. One possibility is that managers find it easier to pass bad 
governance proposals following a good performance because shareholders pay less 
attention and are less focused on active governance during good times.  The alternative 
explanation, following Hermalin and Weisbach (2001), is that the worsening governance 
structure in good times is the outcome of deliberate and efficient negotiations between 
the shareholders and top management: If top managers value discretion, shareholders 
might be willing to allow these managers to entrench themselves (i.e., insulate 
themselves from actions of shareholders) in order to reward them for good performance. 
The current data do not allow us to fully separate these two explanations. However, we 
believe that our evidence is more suggestive of the former story (shareholder inattention 
during good times) for three reasons: First, we only see the change in governance after 
good performance but we do not see a symmetric change toward improvement in 
governance after poor performance. In other words, we observe a reward for good 
performance with no corresponding punishment for bad performance. (Of course the 
punishment may be meted out in a manner unobserved to us.) Second, there is no 
evidence that increased discretion leads to improved performance. If shareholders are 
granting management greater leeway because they have more confidence in 
management’s abilities, then that confidence is misplaced. And finally, as we discuss in 
the data section, bad governance items are presented to stockholders in a manner 
seemingly designed to subvert attention: They are frequently packaged into multi-item 
proposals and are found on significantly longer ballots than ballots that do not include 
bad items.  
 
This paper relates to a large literature on corporate governance which recognizes 
that governance mechanisms arise endogenously in response to the separation of 
ownership and control within large corporations. A number of papers have looked at the 
relationship between governance and firm performance and the forces that endogenously 
shape the governance structure of a firm. See for example Bhagat and Black (1998), 5 
 
Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), Yermack (1996), or Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
for a survey of some of the early literature that examines the tradeoff between different 
governance provisions such as board composition, corporate charter, executive 
compensation, or ownership concentration. More closely related to our paper are studies 
such as Gillan, Hartzell, and Starks (2006) or Boone et al (2007) which analyze how firm 
characteristics such as industry competition, performance, and others affect the tradeoffs 
that firms make in governance. Similarly Gompers et al (2003) and Cremers and Farrel 
(2009) show that omitted variables explain a significant fraction (but not all) of the 
variation in firms’ decisions to adopt certain governance changes. However, none of 
these papers look at the timing of changes in governance provisions in relation to firm 
performance. Our focus on provisions for shareholder voting in special and annual 
meetings allows us to identify the specific channel by which governance changes are 
introduced. 
 
  This paper also speaks to the political economy literature on endogenous election 
timing. This literature finds that in parliamentary systems, elections are more likely to be 
called when economic conditions are good. (See for example Cowdhury (1993) on India, 
Inoguchi (1981), and Cargill and Hutchison (1991) on Japan.) Smith (2003) presents 
evidence that British leaders call elections when their popularity is at its peak and that 
therefore elections predict declining future performance. In presidential systems where 
election timing is exogenous, clearly ballot contents are not. However most likely 
because of the multidimensionality of both politician performance and proposal value, 
there is little work modeling the types of candidates and ballot issues that will appear on 
the ballot at various times. The advantage of beginning work on the endogeneity of ballot 
proposals in the corporate finance context are the clear and simple measures of both firm 
performance and the value of the proposals to the voter (shareholder).     
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as followed: Section 2 discusses the data, 
Section 3 lays out the institutional background of shareholder meetings and voting as 
well as the descriptive statistics, Section 4 describes the results, and Section 5 discusses 
the major implications and concludes. 
 
 
2.  Data 
 
 
  We obtained data on shareholder voting from the Investor Responsibility 
Research Center (IRRC) which has since been acquired by Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS). The ISS aims to track the contents and outcome of management and 
shareholder proposals for the S&P Super 1500 which includes the largest companies in 
the S&P 500, Midcap (top 400), and Small Cap (top 600)  groups. Across our 1997-2004 
sample period, the ISS collected data from 900-1200 companies each year. We observe 
2784 unique firms; the median and average sample firm is present in our dataset for three 
years. Twenty-three percent of firms are present for five or more years. For each proposal 
presented to shareholders for approval, the ISS records the company name, the meeting 
date, a description of the issues included in the proposal, votes for, votes against, 6 
 
abstentions, and the decision rule (i.e., passes with majority or supermajority of votes cast 
or shares outstanding).   
 
  Although the ISS data have been used repeatedly in the corporate finance 
literature to examine questions related to meeting content, they have not, to our 
knowledge, been used previously to examine meeting timing. We note two limitations of 
the data for this purpose. First, the dataset does not include meetings at which the only 
item on the agenda is board elections. This limitation does not affect our key outcome of 
interest: special meetings, because special meetings always contain agenda items other 
than board elections. However, this limitation does mean that some annual meetings are 
missing from our dataset. Bethhel & Gillan (2000) find that 40% of the S&P Super 
1500’s proxy statements include only board and auditor elections, but leave out any non-
standard proposals. We control for annual meeting timing in our regressions. However 
we do not believe that this limitation biases our results as our specifications are robust to: 
1) not controlling for annual meetings; 2) controlling for only those annual meetings 
contained in our dataset; and 3) controlling for annual meetings in each year we have a 
special meeting, basing the timing of missing annual meetings on their timing in an 
adjacent year since annual meeting timing is largely invariant.  
 
  A second limitation is that we do not have a balanced panel. The ISS does not aim 
for balance, but rather for all of the firms in the S&P 1500 in a year. Unfortunately the 
ISS is unable to obtain all such firms in a year. And in fact, when we cross check with 
other sources, we find that the dataset also includes firms that are not in fact in the S&P 
1500 in a given year.
2 To address this second limitation, we limit our sample to firms for 
which we have at least three years of data. Results are robust to limiting focus to the 
sample of firms for which we have at least five years. 
 
We merge our shareholder voting data with earnings data to create our key 
independent variable: firm performance. Our preferred performance measure is the 
magnitude of the earnings surprise. The measure defines earnings surprises relative to 
analysts’ expectations and thus incorporates the market’s priors about firm performance.  
Specifically, using IBES data on realized and forecasted earnings we calculate the level 
of the surprise as the difference between the realized and average forecasted earnings 
divided by the average forecasted earnings. We split this measure into two variables: 
positive and negative earnings surprises. Conditional on a positive surprise, the median 
surprise is three and the mean surprise is seven percent. Conditional on a negative 
surprise, the median surprise is ten and the mean surprise is twenty percent. Our second 
measure of firm performance is quarterly earnings, the change in company’s stock price 
from quarter t-1 to t divided by the price at t-1. (We obtain stock prices from CRSP data.) 
                                                 
2 This second limitation makes it impossible for us to fix the first. We cannot simply go to another source 
and add in all of the missing annual meetings because we do not know if they are in fact missing or not in 
ISS’s universe for that year. If an annual meeting is not in ISS’s universe and we do include it, then we 
could be adding an annual meeting without the corresponding special meeting. We have found no good 
source for special meeting timing outside of ISS. For example, the SEC website is missing a large portion 
of the special meetings that we have in our dataset.  7 
 
We present earnings results for comparison purposes. We merge both IBES and CRSP 
data to our voting dating by ticker. 
 
 
3.  Institutional Details and Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Shareholders in US firms have the opportunity to vote in two types of meetings: 
1) annual meetings and 2) special meetings.
3 Corporate law requires companies to hold 
an annual meeting to elect board members and approve appointed auditors. At that time, 
shareholders are typically updated on the firm’s fiscal health and other management 
proposals. Firms generally hold their annual meeting at the same time each year. Sixty-
five percent of the annual meetings in our dataset happen in April or May, just after the 
accounting data for the prior year are available.   
 
  Outside of the annual meeting, managers can bring proposals to the consideration 
of the shareholders by calling a special meeting with 10-60 days notice, depending on the 
state. Special meetings are much more limited in scope than annual meetings. Only 
agenda items that are announced in the meeting notice may be formally considered in the 
meeting.  Special meetings are not concentrated at any one time of the year. No more 
than 10% of the special meetings in our sample occur in any particular month. Not 
surprisingly, special meetings happen much less frequently than annual. We have nearly 
seven times the number of annual as special meetings. (See Table 1 for descriptive 
statistics.) Thus, special meetings are held with lower frequency than annual meetings 
and can be endogenously called by managers with minimal lag time. We focus on the 
timing and contents of these meetings precisely because of this endogeneity. Our goal is 
to understand how firm performance impacts the timing and agenda of special meetings.  
In the remainder of this section we compare the contents, turnout, and vote margins of 
annual and special meetings.  
  
Theoretically, both shareholders and management can place proposals on the 
ballot of both annual and special meetings. The law varies by state, but generally, 
managers must obtain shareholders’ consent on mergers, charter amendments, issuance of 
new equity, and compensation matters (Maug and Rydqvist, 2001).  Managers are also 
free to place other items on the ballot for shareholder consideration. For example, our 
dataset includes a management proposal for a company name change. Shareholders may 
also put forth proposals; however, shareholder proposals are typically not binding on 
management. Because shareholders must announce their proposals within 120 days of an 
annual meeting and within a “reasonable” time of a special meeting, which they may 
become aware of with only 10 days lead time, it is much easier for shareholders to place 
proposals on the agenda of annual meetings. Eighteen percent (2498/13868) of our 
annual meeting proposals were made by shareholders; only one of the 1688 special 
meeting proposals was shareholder initiated. Thus we focus the remainder of the paper on 
management proposals, noting that the dearth of shareholder proposals in special 
meetings suggests that special meetings may be less open to shareholder influence.  
 
                                                 
3 We ignore written consent. Only 0.13% of the items in our dataset are decided by written consent.  8 
 
   A management proposal may contain more than one substantive item. A single 
vote is taken on the full proposal. For instance, a proposal might include provisions for 
both director and employee stock options. Other times, the items seem less closely 
related. For example, one proposal in our sample bundles an increase in common stock 
with a change in location headquarters. And most interestingly, other proposals bundle 
items that the IRRC says are good for investors with items that the IRRC labels as bad. 
For instance, one proposal in our sample bundles an increase in dual class common stock 
(bad) with the elimination of supermajority requirements (good) along with neutral 
proposals on common stock and charter amendments.  Bethel and Gillan (2000) argue 
that managers use issue bundling to pass less popular items. As demonstrated in Table 1, 
bundling is more common in special meetings, where 30% of proposals contain more 
than one item, compared to annual meetings in which 20% of proposals contain bundles.  
Voting eligibility is defined by the record date set by management, regardless of meeting 
type. Those who own company stock on that date, typically 35 days before the meeting, 
may vote in the upcoming meeting. Shareholders do not have to attend the meeting to 
cast a ballot. They may vote by completing a proxy card, mailed out an average of 20 
days before the meeting (Young, Millar, and Glezen, 1993). A shareholder may cast one 
vote for each share owned on the record date. Turnout is typically quite high. Bethel and 
Gillan (2002) find turnout of approximately 80% for their 1998 sample of S&P1500 
companies suggesting that not only institutional investors but individual investors 
generally participate (Maug and Rydqvist, 2001). Given data limitations, we can only 
calculate turnout for those companies with decision rules that are a function of shares 
outstanding, rather than shares voted. Twenty-four percent of our 13057 management 
proposals are voted on as a function of shares outstanding. Table 1 indicates that turnout 
in annual meetings is significantly higher than turnout in special meetings (83 vs 78 
percent).  Note that this difference in turnout is not simply due to differences in agenda 
items between special and annual meetings. Controlling for agenda items, turnout is 2.5 
percentage points higher in annual meetings. 
 
  Interestingly, management proposals almost always pass. Many scholars have 
speculated that high passage rates are due to management’s control of the record and 
mailing dates (Young, Millar, and Glazen, 1993) and of the packaging of proposals 
(Bethel and Gillan, 2000). Others suggest that high passage rates result from bargaining 
between management and institutional shareholders
4 prior to the voting or even prior to 
the proposal stage. (See Maug and Rydqvist, 2001, for a summary of this literature.)
5 As 
indicated in Table 1, passage rates in our data, which can be calculated for all 
management proposals, are similar to those found in prior literature. Ninety-five percent 
of management proposals in annual meetings and 99% of such proposals in special 
meetings pass. (This is in contrast to a 22 percent passage rate for shareholder proposals.) 
The higher passage rate in special meetings suggests that regardless of the source of 
management’s bargaining power in the voting process, the power is even greater in 
special meetings.  
                                                 
4 See Hartzell and Starks (2003) and Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks (2005) on the influence of institutional 
investors in management compensation. 
5 In a more recent contribution, Listokin (2008) shows that management more often wins than loses close 
elections, suggesting their greater ability to influence votes.  9 
 
 
  While management proposals are overwhelmingly passed, there are large 
differences in the type of proposals that are put on the ballot. In particular there is wide 
variation in how shareholder or manager friendly proposals are. In fact, the ISS publishes 
two forms of guidance for shareholder voting. First, the IRRC, before its acquisition by 
the ISS, published detailed guidelines on how to vote on each type of ballot item.
6 
Second, the ISS produces voting advice for each specific ballot item. So while the IRRC 
guidelines recommend that shareholders vote in favor of items to lower the supermajority 
requirement, to make it easier for shareholders to take action by written consent and to 
adopt confidential voting, the ISS guidelines do not uniformly preclude voting “no” on 
any of these items.  Where the IRRC guidelines advise voting against items to create a 
new class of common stock with superior voting rights, to eliminate cumulative voting 
and to create equity plans that explicitly create repricing, the recommendation of the ISS 
varies by company and by time. In some cases the IRRC does not issue a clear guideline 
but advises considering the matter on a case by case basis. For instance, the organization 
advises that social and environmental issues should be considered on a case by case basis.  
The ISS, on the other hand, considers all items on a case by case basis and thus issues 
recommendations for all votes. Because of a concern that the ISS recommendations may 
be endogenous to the corporation’s governance policies, we follow the more general 
IRRC guidelines to characterize ballot items, but note the general patterns of results (but 
not significance nor magnitude) is robust to either coding. We code items that the IRRC 
recommends voting in favor of as “good” for shareholders, those that the ISS suggests 
voting against as “bad” for shareholders, and those for which the IRRC provides no 
guidance or suggests consideration on a case by case basis as neutral. The vast majority 
of proposals are categorized as neutral. (Please see Appendix Table 1 for an overview of 
good and bad items in our data.) If a proposal contains at least one “bad” item, we label it 
a bad proposal, likewise for good. Thus a proposal can be both bad and good at the same 
time. In practice, only 6 percent of bad proposals are also coded as good.  
  
Examining the characteristics of bad and good proposals, we see support for 
Bethel and Gillan’s (2000) contention that unpopular proposals are more likely to be 
bundled with other proposals.  First, in unreported results, we find that the presence of a 
bad proposal is associated with a significantly longer ballot (more proposals) than good 
or neutral proposals. Second, as shown in Table 1, while in annual meetings 20% of 
proposals contain more than one item, of those proposals that include an item that is 
coded as bad, 29% contain more than one item. While as explained above, we may be 
missing some annual meetings, we are not missing any with bad or good proposals, only 
those meetings on which the only agenda item is board elections. Thus we can compare 
the rate of bundling of bad proposals in special meetings (58%) to the much lower rate in 
annual meetings. Nonetheless, the passage rate for bad proposals, like all proposals in our 
data, is higher in special meetings (96%) than in annual meetings (90%). Good proposals 
are also more frequently bundled than the average proposal. But with good proposals, the 
bundling rate is higher in annual meetings (36%) than special meetings (15%). In 
summary, relative to annual meetings, special meetings have lower turnout, higher rates 
of bundling bad items, and higher passage rates for all types of proposals. These patterns 
                                                 
6 These guidelines are available on the website www.riskmetrics.com.  10 
 
hold across time periods and firm size, as demonstrated in Appendix Tables 2 and 3. One 
interesting time pattern is that there are a smaller number of special meetings (absolutely 
and relative to annual meetings) over time.
7  
  
  One might think that the difference in the content of annual and special meetings 
is simply due to timing. If bad items were more time sensitive, then that would explain 
their greater frequency in special meetings. But a close examination of the agenda of each 
meeting type demonstrates that special meetings are not simply time related. While 
special meetings are more likely to include bad proposals than annual meetings, special 
meetings that are held in the same quarter as an annual meeting are even more likely than 
typical special meetings to include bad proposals. Further, the bad proposals we observe 
most frequently in special meetings are issues that do not appear to be time sensitive at 
all. The top five most relatively frequent are: 1) approve issuance/conversion, 2) 
authorize dual class stock, 3) eliminate special meeting, 4) adopt supermajority lock-in 
provision, and 5) eliminate written consent. On the other hand, the most relatively 
frequent good proposals include leverage buyouts, restructuring, and ratifying auditors; 
items that are arguably very time sensitive.  
 
 
4.  Results 
 
4.1.  Do Managers Endogenously Time Special Meetings? 
 
In this section we ask whether special meetings are timed to occur during or 
following periods when shareholders receive good news about company performance. 
Specifically, we test whether earnings surprises predict the timing and content of special 
meetings by running models of the form of equation (1) 
 
(1) Specialit = +1(surposm)i,t +2(surnegm)i,t  + c(annual)it + S +Y +  F + uit 
 
where i indexes firms and t calendar quarters. Special is an indicator for whether a special 
meeting occurs in the quarter, and surposm and surpnegm are the magnitudes of the 
positive (negative) earnings surprise in the current quarter. These are our key independent 
variables. A positive significant B1 (negative significant B2) would indicate that firms are 
more (less) likely to call special meetings in quarters of greater (less) than expected 
earnings. We control for annual,  whether there is an annual meeting in the quarter 
because companies are not likely to schedule a special meeting in the window of the 
annual meeting. The correlation between the timing of annual and special meetings is 
strongly negative. S, Y, and F are vectors of quarter, year, and firm fixed effects 
                                                 
7 Despite the difference in special meeting frequency, we find similar substantive results before and after 
January 1, 2000; Bebchuck, Cohen, and Wang (2010) document a decreased association between 
governance provisions and abnormal returns beginning in 2000 which they attribute to investor learning. 
However, because there are fewer special meetings over time, we cannot speak to how our findings change 
with the passage Sarbanes Oxley because we have little data for the post period.  
 11 
 
respectively. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm. The basic sample is restricted 
to firms for which we have at least three years of data. 
 
  As the results in Table 2 indicate, managers are more likely to call for a special 
meeting in a quarter of greater than expected returns. The .0341 coefficient on surposm 
indicates that returns that are ten percent higher than expected increase the probability of 
a special meeting in the quarter by .003 percentage points. Thus the mean positive 
surprise of .07 points increases the likelihood of a special meeting by 5.25% (off of a 
mean of .04 special meetings per quarter). The magnitude and significance of this result 
is robust to controlling for firm fixed effects (column 2), one and two lags of earnings 
surprise (columns 3 and 4), and the lead of earnings surprise (column 5).  
 
  There is an asymmetric response to positive and negative earnings surprises. 
While firms are more likely to call a special meeting in response to a positive earnings 
surprise, firms are only slightly less likely to call a special meeting in response to a 
negative earnings surprise, and this result is not robust across specifications. In fact, the 
sign of the coefficient on negative earnings surprise changes with the inclusion of firm 
fixed effects and the magnitude of the absolute value of the estimate increases 
considerably with the addition of the lagged or lead values of the surprise. In column 3, 
our preferred specification which includes current and one lag of earnings surprise, we 
find that returns that are ten percentage points below expected decrease the likelihood of 
a special meeting by only .0004 percentage points, an impact that is nearly an order of 
magnitude smaller than that of the positive surprise.  
 
  As we discussed previously, special meetings must be called with at least 10-60 
days anticipation depending on state. By the time that managers realize that earnings will 
be better than expected, it may be too late to legally schedule a meeting within the current 
quarter. Therefore it is not surprising that we see that there is a smaller positive 
significant impact of a one quarter lagged positive earnings surprise on the likelihood of a 
special meeting in the current quarter. Interestingly, there is a smaller but yet still 
significant positive impact of lagged negative earnings surprises on the likelihood of a 
special meeting in the current quarter. We present evidence later that this finding is 
consistent with some of the better managed firms, calling a special meeting following bad 
news perhaps in order to get ahead of the problem. Given the 10-60 days advanced notice 
needed, it is comforting that we see no significant impact of twice lagged earnings 
surprise (positive or negative) on the likelihood of a special meeting. 
 
  One concern is that our findings could simply represent concurrent trends. 
Companies that are doing better than expected are simply more likely to call special 
meetings. If that were the case, then the lead of the positive surprise should also predict a 
special meeting in the current quarter. We examine this possibility in column 5. We find 
that the lead of the positive surprise actually has a negative association with special 
meeting probability. (Both leads of the negative earnings surprise and the second lead of 
the positive earnings surprise enter with very small coefficients and have no significant 
association with the occurrence of a special meeting.) Thus it does not appear that our 
results simply reflect concurrent trends.  12 
 
 
A second concern is that our findings could be driven by earnings manipulation, 
and therefore, that the causality runs from meeting to positive earnings surprise rather 
than reverse. (This is akin to the political business cycle in the political economy 
literature, whereby politicians are thought to manipulate fiscal or monetary policy to 
produce more favorable economic conditions leading up to an election.
8) While the 
possibility of earnings manipulation should be factored into the forecast, and therefore 
not reflected in the earnings surprise, we present empirical evidence to support this 
supposition.  If earnings manipulation is at play, we should see similar results when the 
outcome is an annual meeting. For annual meetings, the possibility of causation running 
from earnings to meeting time is nonexistent because annual meeting dates are largely 
fixed from year to year. Thus if our story is correct and the meetings are called in 
response to the surprise, we should see no impact of earnings surprises on annual 
meetings. And this is in fact what we find in the final column of the table; coefficients on 
our surprise variables show no economically or statistically significant association with 
the occurrence of an annual meeting.
9 
 
We further investigate the possibility of earnings manipulation in Appendix Table 
4 in which we add a variable on discretionary accruals to our basic timing and content 
specifications.
10 In the first column, we run our basic model predicting the incidence of 
special meetings on the limited sample, for which we have discretionary accruals data. 
Our basic result is weaker in this sample. A ten percent increase in positive surprise 
increases the likelihood of a special meeting by only an insignificant .001 percentage 
points. Lagged positive surprise is a stronger predictor in this sample, a ten percent 
increase in this variable increases the likelihood of a special meeting by .006 percentage 
points. The key finding in this table, however, is that neither the addition of discretionary 
accruals (column 2) or lagged discretionary accruals (column 3) changes any of the 
earnings surprise findings to the third decimal place. The coefficient on discretionary 
accruals is small and insignificant. Thus in the horse race between surprise earnings and 
manipulated earnings, surprise earnings are clearly the better predictor of special 
meetings.  
 
  We interpret the results of Table 2, therefore, as indicating that positive earnings 
surprises causally increase the likelihood of managers’ calling special meetings. We note 
that our results are robust to modeling earnings surprises as simply two dummy variables 
for the presence of a positive or negative earnings surprise. Results are also robust to 
                                                 
8 Empirical evidence for such a cycle has been mixed, although Nordhaus (1975) finds evidence for the 
case of the United States as do Akhemedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) for Russia. 
9 Results are robust to filling in missing annual meetings based on the timing in an adjacent year.   
10 Discretionary accruals are calculated following the Modified Jones method, as described in Dechow, 
Sloan, and Sweeney (1995).  We calculate total accruals as change in current assets over quarter minus 
change in total liabilities over quarter minus change in cash and short term investments over quarter.  We 
then run a regression for each industry quarter of total accruals on a constant, the change in revenues minus 
the change in total receivables and current net property plant and equipment. All variables in the regression, 
including the constant, are normalized by lagged assets. We call the predicted total accruals based on these 
regressions the non-discretionary accruals. We subtract non-discretionary accruals from total accruals to 
obtain discretionary accruals. 13 
 
splitting the sample by time period. Further, our basic result is robust to substituting 
simple stock returns for earnings surprise. While the earnings surprise results can be more 
readily interpreted as causal, given that positive earnings surprises are not always 
associated with positive stock returns, it is comforting to see in Table 3 that as stock 
returns increase, so does the likelihood of a special meeting. Both current and lagged 
stock returns are positively associated with special meeting incidence. Current industry 
level returns are an even greater (by an order of magnitude) predictor of special meetings. 





4.2.  Are Bad Governance Propositions More Frequent after Good Returns? 
 
  Having demonstrated that earnings surprises predict special meetings, we next ask 
whether earnings surprises also predict the items that management proposes in these 
special meetings. We run models of the form of equation 1 in which we replace the 
special meeting indicator for an indicator for a special meeting with at least one bad (for 
shareholders) proposal. As explained earlier, the coding of bad versus good proposals is 
based on the IRRC recommendation.
12 As Column (1) of Table 4 shows, following a ten 
percent positive earnings surprise, management is .002 percentage points more likely to 
call a special meeting with a bad proposal. Column 2 demonstrates that this result is 
robust to the inclusion of lagged earnings surprise. Recall that following the same ten 
percent surprise, management is .003 percentage points more likely to call a special 
meeting. The coefficient on lagged positive earnings surprise in this specification is 2/3 
of the magnitude of the coefficient in the meeting specification of Table 2. Thus the 
results of Table 4 indicate that 2/3 of those meetings induced by a positive earnings 
surprise include a measure that is bad for shareholders. In contrast, only 10% of special 
meetings in our analysis sample overall contain a proposal that is bad for shareholders. 
Recall that over 90 percent of proposals pass and that figure climbs to 96 percent for bad 
proposals at special meetings. So the results indicate that following a positive earnings 
surprise, management is more likely to call a special meeting in which they pass a 
proposal that is bad for shareholders.
13  
 
  Once again we find an asymmetry in the reaction to positive and negative 
earnings surprises. As shown in columns 3 and 4, we find no significant impact of 
negative earnings surprises (contemporaneous or lagged) on the incidence of special 
meetings with bad proposals. Coefficients are at least an order of magnitude smaller than 
                                                 
11 Dimitrov and Jain (2011) find significantly positive returns forty days before annual meetings. Given the 
insignificant positive coefficients in our stock return specification and the difference in window (40 days 
versus one quarter), our results do not directly contradict theirs. In fact, given the potential endogeneity of 
stock returns, we focus on our earnings surprise specifications for causal  interpretation.  
12 In order to focus only on propositions where timing is driven by management and not by external events, 
we do not include takeover related propositions in the content analysis.  
13 Specifications predicting bad proposals that pass produce similar results. And as we demonstrate in 
Appendix Table 4, there is no evidence of earnings manipulation prior to special meetings with bad 
proposals. 14 
 
coefficients on positive earnings surprise. Nor do we find an impact of either positive or 
negative earnings surprises on the incidence of good proposals.  
 
  Our findings thus far indicate that positive earnings surprises result in an 
increased likelihood of special meetings, and in particular, an increased incidence of 
special meetings at which managers propose (and pass) measures that are bad for 
shareholders. One remaining question is the economic significance of these findings. Is 
this increase in management discretion meaningful? We next measure the economic 
significance in terms of the well known GIM-Index (Gompers et. al, 2003) which can be 
thought of as a de jure measure of shareholder power. It awards a point for each 
governance provision in the firm’s charter that reduces shareholder rights. A higher score 
on the GIM-Index indicates greater management power at the expense of the power of 
shareholders.  In the fifth column of the table we run models of the form of equation 1, in 
which the outcome is the firm’s score on the GIM Index and an observation is a firm-year 
(instead of firm-quarter) because the GIM Index is an annual measure. Mirroring our 
results on bad governance proposals, we see that a positive surprise is associated with a 
significant increase in the GIM Index. There is no significant change in the GIM Index in 
a year in which there is a negative earnings surprise. Thus the results of column five 
demonstrate that our management proposals correspond to meaningful changes to 
corporate governance quality.  
  
While the timing of the annual meeting is arguably exogenous, the content of the 
meeting is not. In the remaining columns of the table, we investigate whether earnings 
surprises predict the items that appear on the ballot in annual meetings. We return to 
firm-quarters as our unit of observation; we limit focus on those firm-quarters in which 
there is an annual meeting. We then run models of the form of equation 1, employing an 
indicator for an annual meeting with a bad (good) proposal as the dependent variable. 
And we note that we are not missing any annual meetings with bad or good proposals. 
The missing meetings’ proposals would all be coded as neutral. As demonstrated in 
columns 6-7, there is no evidence that firms are significantly more likely to include either 
good or  bad proposals on an annual meeting ballot following an earnings surprise.  
 
4.3.  Does the Overall Governance Level of the Firm Matter? 
 
Our findings  in the last section indicate that positive earnings surprises result in an 
increased likelihood of special meetings, and in particular, an increased incidence of 
special meetings at which managers propose (and pass) measures that are bad for 
shareholders. We now investigate which types of firms are driving our findings. In 
particular, we ask whether managers in well or poorly governed firms are more likely to 
call special meetings in response to positive earnings surprises. We recognize that there is 
an array of governance measures available. We choose the two most frequently employed 
in the corporate governance literature: 1) We use the GIM-Index (Gompers et. al, 2003) 
that we employed in Table 4.
14 2) We measure the extent to which there are activist large 
shareholders amongst a firm’s investors. For this analysis, we use the block shareholder 
                                                 
14 Because we do not have index data for all of our firms, we lose about twenty percent of our sample in the 
GIM-index analysis.  15 
 
data collected by Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) in which activist shareholders are 
defined as “shareholders who announce their intention of influencing firm policies at the 
time of the block purchase or who are known for activist policies in the past”.
15  
 
  We first divide our firms into two groups based on their average GIM-Index in the 
three years prior to our sample period. We label firms with a GIM-Index greater than nine 
(median governance) as poorly governed firms. We label the remainder as well governed. 
Our results are robust to alternative cutoffs for poorly and well governed. Regardless of 
cutoff, this classification is based on the average GIM-index in the three years prior to the 
start of our sample period in order to minimize mechanical correlation. In Table 5, we 
rerun the analyses of Tables 2 and 4 by governance quality. Poorly (well) governed firms 
appear in the odd (even) columns. The first two columns demonstrate that our finding of 
an increased likelihood of a special meeting in the quarter of a positive earnings surprise 
is driven by poorly governed firms. The coefficient on this variable in the poorly 
governed sample is .0774 and significant at the 1% level, while in the well governed 
sample the coefficient is an insignificant -.0142. However, when we examine the 
coefficients on the lags, we do see that there is a significant increase in special meetings 
in the quarter following a positive surprise and (to a much lesser, but still significant 
extent) a negative surprise in the well governed firms. We present only the once lagged 
specification for parsimony. However, results are robust to the inclusion of a second lag. 
Both the positive and negative second lags enter insignificantly. In columns 3 and 4, we 
present our robustness check by analyzing whether annual meetings are more likely to be 
set up after good earnings surprises. For neither type of firms do earnings surprises 
predict the timing of annual meetings.   
 
  While we find that both poor and, to a lesser extent, well governed firms call 
special meetings endogenously with respect to earnings surprises, we demonstrate in the 
remainder of the table that only poorly governed firms are more likely to put bad 
governance items on the ballot in response to that same surprise. In column 5 of the table, 
the coefficient of .0514 indicates that when earnings are ten percent higher than expected, 
firms are .005 percentage points more likely to call a special meeting in which they 
propose an item that is bad for shareholders. Comparing this result to the .0774 
coefficient in the special meeting specifications, this suggests that for the poorly 
governed sample, as in the full sample, 2/3 of those special meetings that are induced by 
positive earnings surprises contain a bad proposal. We find no impact of a negative 
concurrent earnings surprise on the frequency of special meetings with bad proposals. We 
do find, however, consistent with our earlier findings, that lagged positive surprise has a 
smaller positive impact on the likelihood of a bad special meeting. We further find a 
positive significant impact of lagged negative earnings surprise; however, this result is 
economically insignificant as it is more than an order of magnitude smaller than our 
positive earnings surprise main effect. As for good proposals, we do find some evidence 
of an increase following a lagged positive earnings surprise. We also find a positive 
significant relationship between negative concurrent earnings surprise and good 
proposals, but this result is economically insignificant. Previewing our large shareholder 
                                                 
15 The authors cite Carl Icahn, Warren Buffet, and the Bass brothers as examples of individual activists. 
They further note that there are public and private pension funds that they classify as activist.  16 
 
results, none of the good proposal results are robust across definitions of management 
quality. 
 
  In contrast to the poorly governed firms, in the well governed sample we find no 
predictive power of earnings surprise for special meetings with either good or bad items. 
To the extent that these firms are more likely to call special meetings following positive, 
and to some extent negative earnings, it does not seem to be for the purpose of passing 
proposals that will limit shareholder power. Therefore, we conclude that the results of 
Table 5 indicate that our findings of an increased likelihood of special meetings (that 
contain bad for shareholder proposals) are driven by poorly managed firms. 
 
  We provide additional evidence to support our contention that results are driven 
by poorly managed firms by turning to our alternative governance measure: the 
prevalence of activist shareholders. We calculate two such measures of well governed 
firms: 1) We define well governed firms that have at least one activist shareholder who 
owns at least 5% of the firm’s equity. 2) Our alternative measure of good governance is 
that the company had at least 10% of their equity held by activist shareholders.
16 We 
define these measures over the three years prior to the first year in which the firm appears 
in our dataset. 
 
  Across the two measures, we find evidence that our principal finding of increased 
likelihood of a special meeting, and in particular, a special meeting with a bad proposal, 
is driven by poorly governed firms. In Table 6, results for poorly (well) governed firms 
are found in even (odd) columns. The first two columns are the 5% activist specification, 
and the second two columns are the 10% activist specification. By either measure, we see 
that a positive significant relationship between concurrent positive earnings surprise and 
the presence of a special meeting exists only for the poorly governed firms. Although we 
see some indication that well governed firms are more likely to call special meetings 
following a quarter with a positive earnings surprise (coefficient on lagged earnings 
surprise is positive significant), we once again find no evidence that the better governed 
firms are more likely to put bad items on the ballot in response to an earnings surprise.
17  
Table 7 examines the endogeneity of ballot content with respect to earnings surprises. We 
find that by either definition, poorly managed firms (but not well managed firms) are 
more likely to call a special meeting with a bad item in a quarter of positive earnings 
surprise.
 18  
 
The finding that our bad item results are  driven by the more poorly governed 
firms is also robust to following the ISS (vote by vote) coding instead of the IRRC issue 
by issue coding. (Please see Appendix Table 5 for these results.) After demonstrating in 
the first two columns of the table that our meeting timing results hold in this slightly 
                                                 
16 Results are robust to using 5 and 20% as the cutoffs.  
17 While we do not table the result in the interest of parsimony, for neither firm type do we find a 
significant relationship between earnings surprises and the timing of annual meetings.  
18 Hung, Kuang, and Gorton (2009) note another interesting difference in the behavior of well and poorly 
managed firms. The authors argue that private information is more valuable in a corporation with bad 
governance because that private information will not be acted on by the company.  17 
 
smaller sample for which ISS recommendations are available, we show in column 3 that 
lagged positive surprises predict bad ballot items, but that contemporary positive 
surprises do not significantly predict bad ballot items; in fact the coefficient is negative. 
However, in the remaining columns of the table, we break the sample into well and 
poorly governed firms. Once again, we see larger coefficients on positive surprises (both 
contemporary and lagged) for poorly governed firms (as measured by the either the GIM 
or activist measures) than for well-governed firms. Note that there is no analogous good 
specification here as there is no neutral classification under the ISS guidelines; proposals 
that are not bad, are good. 
19  
 
5.  Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Our results demonstrate the endogeneity of special meetings and special meeting 
content with respect to firm performance. Positive earnings surprises increase the 
likelihood of a special meeting being called in the current or following quarter. More 
notably, these surprises increase the incidence of special meetings in which management 
proposes items that hurt shareholder interests  either by reducing shareholder power or by 
increasing rents to management. As we note in the background section, these bad 
management proposals have a passage rate of 96 percent in special meetings. And their 
passage leads to meaningful changes in corporate governance quality as measured by the 
GIM-Index.  The fact that our findings are driven by companies that are labeled as poorly 
managed, according to both the GIM-Index and the fraction of activist shareholders, 
suggests that managers may be strategically timing when to propose bad governance 
measures in order to have the greatest chance of getting them approved. A positive 
earnings surprise does not predict the incidence of an annual meeting or the meeting 
content, conditional on occurrence. But yet these same surprises predict the timing and 
content of low turnout, high passage rate special meetings. In special meetings, bad items 
are nearly twice as likely (as compared to annual meetings) to be bundled with other 
items in a single proposal, a strategy that Bethel and Gillam (2000) suggest managers 
employ to pass less popular items.   
 
But the shareholder behavior is more difficult to interpret. Are shareholders 
allowing these bad proposals to pass in order to reward management for the better than 
expected earnings? Hermalin and Weisbach (1999) propose that if top managers value 
discretion over the firm, shareholders might be willing to loosen governance oversight if 
they learn that the CEO is of high quality and delivers positive returns. Turning to the 
political economy literature, we might think of allowing these proposals to pass as a form 
of retrospective voting first noted by Key (1966), in which voters reward or punish 
incumbents based on past performance. The alternative hypothesis is that shareholders 
simply become less attentive when times are good, and therefore, the passage of these 
bad proposals is not intentional on the part of shareholders. 
                                                 
19 We do find some significant coefficients on lagged negative earnings surprises for both types of firms, 
but coefficients are small and economically insignificant. While there is little evidence that either type of 
firm is more likely to put good items on the ballot in response to earnings shocks, there is a negative 
significant coefficient in the 5% good specification for poorly managed firms. But this finding is not robust 
across definitions of governance quality. 18 
 
 
While we cannot definitively rule out either of these stories, we can provide 
evidence in support of the hypothesis that shareholder inattention affects the timing and 
content of special meetings. First, as we show in the results section, there is an 
asymmetry between good and bad earnings surprises. If more or less managerial 
discretion were granted as a reward for performance, we would also expect to see a 
punishment for poor performance. However, we do not observe a decrease in managerial 
discretion following poor performance. This leaves the possibilities that there is no 
punishment, or that the punishment comes in some other form that we do not observe in 
our data. Second, the results in Table 2 show that following a quarter in which there is a 
special meeting, we see no additional earnings surprise. In fact, in the quarter following 
the special meeting, the firm is less likely to post a positive earnings surprise. Now, 
analysts might have updated their priors so higher earnings are no longer a surprise; but 
even in the simple stock returns specifications we see that, if anything, returns are 
negative following special meetings.
20 This decline in earnings is consistent with Smith 
(2003) who argues that elections are called when performance is at its peak. Thus the 
increased discretion awarded by bad governance proposals does not translate into 
increased stock returns (at least in the short term). Again, this is not dispositive evidence 
of shareholder inattention, but it suggests at the least that if shareholders are granting 
greater discretion because of increased confidence in management’s abilities, that 
increased confidence is misplaced.  Our final piece of suggestive evidence is that bad 
governance items seem designed in a manner to subvert attention: As we discuss in the 
background section, they are frequently packaged into multi-item proposals, particularly 
when they appear in special meetings, and are found on ballots that are significantly 
longer than ballots that do not include bad items.  
 
While the paucity of special meetings may mean that this is not a channel that 
leads to frequent changes in governance provisions, we note that the larger economic 
significance of this work is in the proof of concept by identifying a mechanism by which 
corporate governance worsens. Our findings suggest that firms’ governance structures are 
importantly shaped by endogenous forces such as firm performance. Managers use times 
of good firm performance to pass ballot items that hurt shareholder interest. Moreover, 
this margin seems to be more easily exploited in firms that already have weaker 
governance mechanisms. It is interesting to note that in the vast majority of cases, 
propositions which are passed under a particular management team do not expire once 
the management retires. Since governance structures do not “reset” at the end of a CEO’s 
term, they limit shareholder power going forward. Thus the seeds of bad governance 
seem to be sown in good times. 
 
                                                 
20 Similarly, Cuñat, Gine, and Guadalupe (forthcoming) find that the passage of a shareholder proposal—
which increases shareholder’s power at the expense of management’s-- causes an increase in firm value. 
However, Karpoff, Matesta, and Walkling (1996) find no impact of the passage of shareholder proposals on 










Number of Meetings   7924  1164 
Number of Proposals  13868  1688 
Numbers Shareholder Proposals  2498  1 
Number Management Proposals  11370  1687 
Percent of Proposals with More than One Item  20%  30% 
Turnout (Management Proposals)
1 83%  78% 
Passage Rate (Management Proposals)  95%  99% 
Number Bad Management Proposals  500 (4%)  92 (5%) 
Percent of Proposals with More than One Item  29%  58% 
Passage Rate  90%  96% 
Number Good Management proposals  4149 (36%)  247 (15%) 
Percent of Proposals with More than One Item  36%  15% 
Passage Rate  95%  97% 
Passage rates do not include 73 management proposals, for which information is missing. 





Table 2: Impact of Abnormal Returns on Meeting Timing 














                    
PosSurprise 0.0341**  0.0295***  0.0273***  0.0310***  0.0355***  -0.00965 
 (0.0150)  (0.00806)  (0.00818)  (0.00819)  (0.00821)  (0.0193) 
NegSurprise 0.000606***  -0.000853  0.00351***  0.00335***  0.00301*** -0.00127 
 (0.000192)  (0.000743) (0.00118)  (0.00118)  (0.00122)  (0.00278) 
PosSurprise1     0.0165**  0.0174**    0.0221 
     (0.00843)  (0.00852)    (0.0198) 
NegSurprise1     0.00480***  0.00523***     -0.00188 
     (0.00163)  (0.00191)      (0.00384) 
Pos Surprise2        -0.00990      
       (0.00890)       
NegSurprise2       -0.00112       
       (0.00192)       
Pos Lead 1          -0.0124***   
         (0.00747)   
Neg Lead 1          -0.0007   
         (0.0006)   
Pos Lead 2          -0.00019   
         (0.00178)   
Neg Lead 2           -.0006728    
         (0.000818)   
Annual Meet  -0.0287*** 
-
0.0181*** -0.0183*** -0.0180*** -0.0145***   
 (0.00249)  (0.00254)  (0.00255)  (0.00254)  -0.00232   
Quarter F.E.   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year F.E.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm F.E.  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 30621  30621  30547  30405  30621  30547 
R-squared 0.012  0.126  0.126  0.127  0.121  0.411 
The unit of observation is a firm-quarter. Data on shareholder voting come from ISS, which covers the S&P Super 
1500 (500 large cap, 400 mid cap, 600 small cap firms). Only firms for which ISS collects data for at least three years 
are included in our sample. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if there is a special meeting in the quarter 
and zero otherwise. PosSurprise (NegSurprise) is constructed as the positive (negative) earnings surprise of quarterly 
earnings over the analysts’ consensus forecast. PosSurprise 1(2) is the one (two) quarter lagged earning surprise. 
Parallel for NegSurprise 1(2). Pos Lead (Neg Lead) is the one quarter lead earnings surprise. Annual Meet is a 
dummy equal to one if there is an annual meeting in the quarter and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors, clustered 
at the firm level, are shown in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3: Stock Market Returns and Meeting Timing 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES dspecialm  dspecialm  dspecialm dspecialm dspecialm dspecialm dannualm dannualm 
                          
Stock  returns  0.00683  0.00447**  0.00423**  0.00484*** 0.00474*** 0.00415***  0.00638  0.00522 
  (0.00454) (0.00177) (0.00178) (0.00178) (0.00178) (0.00166) (0.00415) (0.00419) 
Lagged  stock 
returns      0.00391***  0.00385***      0.00192 
      (0.00106)  (0.00106)      (0.00248) 
Twice lagged 
stock  returns      0.00138  0.00118      -0.00772***
      (0.00105)  (0.00105)      (0.00246) 
Industry level 
stock  returns     0.0416   0.0570**      -0.0200  0.0514 
     (0.0255)  (0.0272)     (0.0597)  (0.0639) 
Lagged 
industry level 
stock  returns       0.0160        -0.0552 
       (0.0229)        (0.0537) 
Twice lagged 
industry level 
stock  returns       0.0627**        0.196*** 
       (0.0259)        (0.0607) 
Lead stock 
returns        -0.00445***   
        (0.00166)    
Twice led 
stock  returns        -0.00267    
        (0.00158)    22 
 
dannualm  -0.0304*** -0.0188*** -0.0188*** -0.0182*** -0.0183*** -0.0113***     
  (0.00254) (0.00251) (0.00251) (0.00251) (0.00251) (0.00194)     
Quarter  F.E.  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm  F.E. No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  32020 32020 32020 31633 31633 30888 32020 31633 
R-squared 0.012 0.141 0.141 0.143 0.143 0.121 0.408 0.408 
The unit of observation is a firm-quarter. Data on shareholder voting come from ISS, which covers the S&P Super 1500 (500 large cap, 400 mid cap, 600 small 
cap firms). Only firms for which ISS collects data for at least three years are included in our sample.  Stock returns are calculated as the change in the stock 
price from period t-1 to period t normalized by the price at t-1. The Annual Meet is a dummy equal to one if there is an annual meeting in the quarter and zero 
otherwise. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are shown in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Impact of Abnormal Returns on Meeting Agenda 


























                      
PosSurprise 0.0174***  0.0211***  -0.00219  -0.00295  0.3134652** 0.00947 -0.0317 
  (0.00232) (0.00234) (0.00320) (0.00325)  (0.1497526)  (0.0547) (0.104) 
NegSurprise 0.000    0.000398  0.000291  0.000435   -0.006338   -0.00893  0.0145 
  (0.000214) (0.000338) (0.000295) (0.000470)  (0.0129998)   (0.0153)  (0.0290) 
PosSurprise  1   0.0114***   0.00389      -0.0260  0.0921
   (0.00241)    (0.00335)    (0.0446)  (0.0847) 
NegSurprise1   -0.000620    -0.000227    0.0269  0.0691* 
   (0.000466)    (0.000648)    (0.0210)  (0.0399)
Annual Meet  -0.0888***  -0.0881***  -0.201***  -0.201***      
  (0.00177) (0.00177) (0.00245) (0.00246)      
Special  Meet           
           
Quarter  F.E.  Yes Yes Yes Yes  No  Yes Yes 
Year  F.E.  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm  F.E.  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations  30621 30547 30621 30547  7656  7454 7454 
R-squared  0.182 0.181 0.285 0.285 0.9234  0.348 0.180 
The unit of observation is a firm-quarter. Data on shareholder voting come from ISS, which covers the S&P Super 1500 (500 large cap, 400 mid cap, 600 small 
cap firms). The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if there is a special meeting in the quarter and zero otherwise. PosSurprise (NegSurprise) is 
constructed as the positive (negative) earnings surprise of quarterly earnings over the analysts’ consensus forecast. PosSurprise 1(2) is the one (two) quarter 
lagged earning surprise. Parallel for NegSurprise 1(2). Pos Lead (Neg Lead) is the one quarter lead earnings surprise. Annual Meet is a dummy equal to one if 24 
 
there is an annual meeting in the quarter and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are shown in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 25 
 
Table 5: Impact of Abnormal Returns on Meeting Timing and Agenda, by Governance Quality (GIM Index) 






























   Gindex>9  Gindex<9  Gindex>9 Gindex<9 Gindex>9 Gindex<9 Gindex>9 Gindex<9 
PosSurprise 0.0774*** -0.0142 -0.0362 0.0147  0.0514***  -0.00374  -0.00208  -0.00429 
 (0.0125)  (0.0112)  (0.0280)  (0.0273)  (0.00347) (0.00397) (0.00477) (0.00567) 
NegSurprise  -0.00192 0.00529*** -0.00490 0.00132 2.64e-05 0.000581 0.00147* 0.000423 
 (0.00216)  (0.00152)  (0.00486)  (0.00372) (0.000602)  (0.000465) (0.000826) (0.000663)
PosSurprise1 -0.00143 0.0387*** 0.0323 0.00884  0.0163***  -0.00560  0.0116**  -0.00314 
 (0.0127)  (0.0118)  (0.0284)  (0.0287)  (0.00353) (0.00428) (0.00484) (0.00610) 
NegSurprise1  -0.00338  0.00713*** 0.000631 -0.00500  0.00209* -0.000897 -0.000126 -0.000450 
 (0.00442)  (0.00202)  (0.00992)  (0.00492) (0.00123)  (0.000617) (0.00168)  (0.000880)
Annual Meet  -0.0143***  -0.0138***      0.0844***  0.0882***  -0.184***  -0.222*** 
 (0.00302)  (0.00261)      (0.00267) (0.00274) (0.00366) (0.00391) 
Year  F.E.  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm  F.E.  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  12815  17208 12815  17208  12815 13233 12815 13233 
R-squared  0.117  0.137 0.469  0.378  0.195 0.198 0.256 0.327 
The unit of observation is a firm-quarter. Data on shareholder voting come from ISS, which covers the S&P Super 1500 (500 large cap, 400 mid 
cap, 600 small cap firms). The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if there is a special meeting in the quarter and zero otherwise. 
PosSurprise (NegSurprise) is constructed as the positive (negative) earnings surprise of quarterly earnings over the analysts’ consensus forecast. 
PosSurprise 1(2) is the one (two) quarter lagged earning surprise. Parallel for NegSurprise 1(2). Pos Lead (Neg Lead) is the one quarter lead 
earnings surprise. Annual Meet is a dummy equal to one if there is an annual meeting in the quarter and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors, 
clustered at the firm level, are shown in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Impact of Abnormal Returns on Meeting Timing, by Governance Quality 
(Activist Shareholders) 










   5% activist 
no 5% 
activist >=10%  activist 
<10% 
activist 
PosSurprise -0.00161  0.0910***  -0.0160  0.0561*** 
 (0.0105)  (0.0154)  (0.0139)  (0.0109) 
NegSurprise 0.00440*** 0.00722  -0.00548***  -0.00327 
 (0.00129)  (0.00965)  (0.00173)  (0.00204) 
PosSurprise1 0.0334*** -0.00502  0.0489***  -0.00346 
 (0.0108)  (0.0148)  (0.0141)  (0.0114) 
NegSurprise1 0.00602***  0.00214  0.00763***  -0.000829 
 (0.00180)  (0.0102)  (0.00228)  (0.00490) 
dannualm -0.0201***  -0.00766  -0.0210*** 
-
0.0163*** 
 (0.00291)  (0.00668)  (0.00412)  (0.00351) 
             
Year F.E.   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Quarter F.E.  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Firm F.E.   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations 23183  4284  11821  15646 
R-squared 0.116  0.123  0.119  0.115 
The unit of observation is a firm-quarter. Data on shareholder voting come from ISS, 
which covers the S&P Super 1500 (500 large cap, 400 mid cap, 600 small cap firms). 
Only firms for which ISS collects data for at least three years are included in our 
sample. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if there is a special meeting in 
the quarter and zero otherwise. PosSurprise (NegSurprise) is constructed as the positive 
(negative) earnings surprise of quarterly earnings over the analysts’ consensus forecast. 
PosSurprise 1(2) is the one (two) quarter lagged earning surprise. Parallel for 
NegSurprise 1(2). Pos Lead (Neg Lead) is the one quarter lead earnings surprise. 
Annual Meet is a dummy equal to one if there is an annual meeting in the quarter and 
zero otherwise. We follow Cronquist and Fahlenbrach (2009) in defining activist 
shareholders.  Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are shown in 
parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.127 
 
Table 7: Impact of Abnormal Returns on Meeting Agenda, by Governance Quality (Activist Shareholders) 















































PosSurprise  -0.00330 0.0730*** -0.00457 0.0410*** 0.00391 -0.0201*** 0.00218  -0.00608 
  (0.00299) (0.00515) (0.00393) (0.00333) (0.00421) (0.00607) (0.00588) (0.00417) 
NegSurprise 0.000561 0.000224  0.000869*  0.000362 0.000692 -0.00243 0.000838 0.000467 
 (0.000370)  (0.00321)  (0.000488)  (0.000619)  (0.000521) (0.00378) (0.000731)  (0.000776) 
PosSurprise1 -0.00485  -0.00723  -0.00581  -0.00898*** 0.00393  -0.000144  0.00480  0.00216 
  (0.00310) (0.00494) (0.00399) (0.00346) (0.00436) (0.00582) (0.00597) (0.00434) 
NegSurprise1  -0.00105** 0.00737** -0.00146** 0.00298**  -0.000653  0.00211  -0.000884  6.90e-05 
  (0.000515) (0.00338) (0.000645) (0.00149) (0.000725) (0.00399) (0.000965) (0.00187) 
dannualm -0.0863***  -0.138***  -0.0857***  -0.101*** -0.209*** -0.193*** -0.232*** -0.185*** 
  (0.00202) (0.00561) (0.00279) (0.00263) (0.00284) (0.00661) (0.00418) (0.00330) 
                          
Yeah  F.E.  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter  F.E.  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firms F.E.  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  23183  4284  11821 15646 23183  4284  11821 15646 
R-squared 0.175 0.278 0.185 0.193 0.289 0.247 0.313 0.254 
The unit of observation is a firm-quarter. Data on shareholder voting come from ISS, which covers the S&P Super 1500 (500 large cap, 400 mid cap, 600 small cap 
firms). Only firms for which ISS collects data for at least three years are included in our sample. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if there is a 
special meeting in the quarter and zero otherwise. PosSurprise (NegSurprise) is constructed as the positive (negative) earnings surprise of quarterly earnings over 
the analysts’ consensus forecast. PosSurprise 1(2) is the one (two) quarter lagged earning surprise. Parallel for NegSurprise 1(2). Pos Lead (Neg Lead) is the one 
quarter lead earnings surprise. Annual Meet is a dummy equal to one if there is an annual meeting in the quarter and zero otherwise. We follow Cronquist and 28 
 
Fahlenbrach (2009) in defining activist shareholders. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are shown in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.129 
 
Appendix Table 1: Coding of Proposals in Our Dataset   
Bad Proposals  Good Proposals  
Stock 
Authorize or increase authorized preferred stock  Decrease or cancel authorized preferred stock 




Eliminate cumulative voting  Adopt cumulative voting 
Adopt supermajority requirement   Eliminate supermajority requirement 
Adopt supermajority lock in  Restore written consent 
Eliminate or limit written consent  Allow internet voting 
  Eliminate preemptive rights 
  
Special Meetings 
Eliminate or limit special meetings  Restore right to call special meeting 
 
Board of Directors 
Approve classified board  Repeal classified board 
No shareholder approval to fill vacancy  Approval of board size 
  Adopt director liability provision 
  Allow board to set director fees 
Compensation 
Adopt or redeem poison pill  Approve long-term bonus plan 
Extend term of stock option plan  Adopt stock option plan 
  Limit annual awards 
  Adopt deferred compensation plan 
  Adopt advance notice requirement 
Restructuring 
  Approve restructuring/leveraged buyout 
  Approve governance agreement 
Other 
Opt out of state takeover law  Ratify auditors 
Exchange underwater options   
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Appendix Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, by Time Period 













Number of Meetings   4218 910 1946 182 1760 72
Number of Proposals  7292 1315 3203 270 3373 103
Numbers Shareholder Proposals  1089 1 557 0 852 0
Number Management Proposals  6203 1314 2646 270 2521 103
Percent of Proposals with More than 
One Item 
26% 32% 20% 25% 5% 15%
Turnout (Management Proposals)
1 83% 78% 83% 79% 84% 81%
Passage Rate (Management Proposals)  99% 99% 97% 96% 85% 100%
Number Bad Management Proposals  281 (5%) 62 (5%) 122 (5%) 20 (7%) 97 (4%) 10 (10%)
Percent of Proposals with More than 
One Item 
36% 63% 25% 50% 16% 40%
Passage Rate  89% 95% 91% 95% 93% 100%
Number Good Management proposals  2249 (36%) 198 (15%) 890 (34%) 34 (13%) 1010 (40%) 15 (15%)
Percent of Proposals with More than 
One Item 
44% 42% 33% 21% 8% 7%





Appendix Table 3: Descriptive Statistics, by Asset Size 













Number of Meetings   2827 322 2662 359 2375 341
Number of Proposals  4416 447 4483 558 4865 529
Numbers Shareholder Proposals  243 0 541 1 1690 0
Number Management Proposals  4173 447 3942 557 3175 529
Percent of Proposals with More than 
One Item 
23% 28% 19% 30% 17% 37%
Turnout (Management Proposals)
1 83% 80% 83% 78% 83% 78%
Passage Rate (Management Proposals)  97% 99% 97% 98% 92% 99%
Number Bad Management Proposals  154(3%) 33(7%) 188 (5%) 36(6%) 154(5%) 23(4%)
Percent of Proposals with More than 
One Item 
31% 58% 30% 47% 28% 74%
Passage Rate  80%  97% 93% 92% 97% 100%
Number Good Management proposals  1440(35%) 70(16%) 1446(37%) 89(16%) 1225(39%) 71(13%)
Percent of Proposals with More than 
One Item 
38% 43% 32% 39% 28% 31%
Passage Rate  96% 100% 96% 94% 92% 97%
Sample size is smaller than in Table 1 because asset information is unavailable for some firms. Passage rates do not include 73 management proposals, for which 
information is missing. 
1Turnout is only available for the 24% of sample votes whose decision rule is a function of votes outstanding. 
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Appendix Table 4: Discretionary Accruals, Meeting Timing, and Content 
































                             
PosSurprise 0.0140 0.0139 0.0142 0.0004 0.0004 0.0007 0.0080  0.0081 0.0076 
  (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0051)  (0.0051) (0.0051) 
NegSurprise -0.0127***  -0.0126*** 0.0127***  0.0009  0.0009  0.0010*  -0.0001  0.0000  -0.0001 
  (0.00192)  (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008)  (0.0007) (0.0008) 
PosSurprise1  0.0573***  0.0574***  0.0572***  0.0088** 0.0088** 0.0084** -0.0101*  -0.0100*  -0.0101* 
  (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0050) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0053)  (0.0053)  (0.01) 
NegSurprise1  0.0183***  0.0183***  0.0182***  -0.0014* -0.0014* -0.0014*  0.0003  0.0003  0.0003 
  (0.00267)  (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010)  (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Discretionary 
Accruals   -0.0005    0.0002    -0.0003  
   (0.0004)    (0.0001)     (0.0002)  
Lagged 
discretionary 
accruals     0.0006    0.0001     0.0006*** 
     (0.0004)    (0.0001)    (0.0002) 
dannualm -0.0138***  -0.0138*** -0.0142*** -0.0969*** -0.0969***  -0.0992*** -0.202***  -0.202***  -0.200*** 
  (0.00260)  (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0030)  (0.0030) (0.0030) 
Constant  0.0208*** 0.0208*** 0.0212*** 0.0971*** 0.0971*** 0.0995***  0.203***  0.203***  0.202*** 
  (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0032)  (0.0032) (0.0032) 
            33 
 
Observations  21320 21320 21299 21320 21320 21299 21320  21320 21299 
R-squared  0.105 0.105 0.107 0.179 0.179 0.181 0.261  0.261 0.261 
The unit of observation is a firm-quarter. Data on shareholder voting come from ISS, which covers the S&P Super 1500 (500 large cap, 400 mid cap, 600 small cap 
firms). Only firms for which ISS collects data for at least three years are included in our sample. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if there is a special 
meeting in the quarter and zero otherwise. PosSurprise (NegSurprise) is constructed as the positive (negative) earnings surprise of quarterly earnings over the 
analysts’ consensus forecast. PosSurprise 1(2) is the one (two) quarter lagged earning surprise. Parallel for NegSurprise 1(2). Pos Lead (Neg Lead) is the one quarter 
lead earnings surprise. Discretionary accruals are calculated following the Modified Jones method, as described in Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995).  We 
calculate total accruals as change in current assets over quarter minus change in total liabilities over quarter minus change in cash and short term investments over 
quarter.  We then run a regression for each industry quarter of total accruals on a constant, the change in revenues minus the change in total receivables and current 
net property plant and equipment. All variables in the regression are normalized by lagged assets. We call the predicted total accruals based on these regressions the 
non-discretionary accruals. We subtract non-discretionary accruals from total accruals to obtain discretionary accruals. Sample size is smaller than in Table 2 due to 
missing discretionary accrual data. Annual Meet is a dummy equal to one if there is an annual meeting in the quarter and zero otherwise. Year, quarter, and firm 
fixed effects are included in all specifications. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are shown in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix Table 5: Robustness to ISS Coding 
























gindex>9 gindex<9  >5%  activist 
no 5% 
activist 
surposm 0.0285***  -0.0182 -0.00139 0.00738 0.00289 -0.00365 0.00556
(0.0090) (0.0206) (0.0035) (0.0048) (0.0062) (0.0069) (0.0100)
surnegm -0.00467***  -0.0034 0.00157** -0.00141 0.00241*** 0.00200** 0.000827
(0.0017) (0.0039) (0.0007) (0.0025) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0043)
lsurposm1 0.0232**  0.0231 0.00648* 0.0115** 0.00887 0.00237 0.00461
(0.0093) (0.0214) (0.0036) (0.0047) (0.0069) (0.0070) (0.0120)
lsurnegm1 0.00621***  0.00079 -0.00273*** -7.76E-05 -0.00383*** -0.00301*** -0.000728
(0.0023) (0.0052) (0.0009) (0.0019) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0048)
dannualm -0.0199***  -0.192*** -0.137*** -0.252*** -0.213*** -0.120***
(0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0036) (0.0043) (0.0036) (0.0049)
Observations 26203  26203 26203 10643 11684 14748 4962
R-squared 0.127  0.381 0.276 0.216 0.344 0.278 0.207
The unit of observation is a firm-quarter. Data on shareholder voting come from ISS, which covers the S&P Super 1500 (500 large cap, 400 mid cap, 600 small 
cap firms). Only firms for which ISS collects data for at least three years are included in our sample. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if there is a 
special meeting in the quarter and zero otherwise. PosSurprise (NegSurprise) is constructed as the positive (negative) earnings surprise of quarterly earnings over 
the analysts’ consensus forecast. PosSurprise 1(2) is the one (two) quarter lagged earning surprise. Parallel for NegSurprise 1(2). Pos Lead (Neg Lead) is the one 
quarter lead earnings surprise. Annual Meet is a dummy equal to one if there is an annual meeting in the quarter and zero otherwise. Year, quarter, and firm fixed 
effects are included in all specifications. We follow Cronquist and Fahlenbrach (2009) in defining activist shareholders.  Robust standard errors, clustered at the 
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